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he Medicaid program is grounded in a statute
that is one of the most complex of all federal
laws. An insurer of more than 60 million people —
and poised to begin serving 16 million more by

2019 — Medicaid will be reex
amined this year, in all its legal
complexities, by the U.S. Supreme
Court, which has agreed to hear
California’s appeal in the case
Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living
Center of Southern California. The
Court’s ruling could fundamen
tally alter states’ accountability to
beneficiaries and providers when
their official conduct allegedly
violates Medicaid’s essential fed
eral requirements.
The Maxwell-Jolly case was pre
cipitated by a series of deep cuts
to provider payments that were
enacted by the California legisla
ture and aimed at services used
predominantly by the state’s most
severely disabled beneficiaries.

The payment reductions were
halted by the U.S. Court of Ap
peals for the Ninth Circuit, but
this action by no means ended
the dispute. Indeed, the question
before the Supreme Court is of
far greater consequence than that
of specific provider payments: it
is whether beneficiaries and pro
viders have the right to seek ju
dicial redress when they allege
that state conduct abridges fed
eral law and threatens health and
safety.
The statute regulating Medic
aid, unlike that underlying Medi
care, does not expressly address
the question of whether private
persons deserve access to the
courts in order to prevent harm
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arising from potentially unlaw
ful state conduct. Virtually since
Medicaid’s inception,1 states have
disputed the ability of beneficia
ries and providers to hold Medi
caid programs judicially account
able under federal law. Over the
years, a series of Supreme Court
decisions have offered a partial
answer: private individuals can
sue when they believe a state’s
conduct has violated a right un
der Medicaid. In such cases, the
suit is brought under a law dat
ing back to the Civil War Amend
ments and commonly referred
to by its U.S. Code number, Sec
tion 1983, which enables private
parties to sue to stop state inter
ference with a federal legal right.
But many of Medicaid’s re
quirements, including some of
the most important ones that
give real meaning to the legal
right to coverage itself, have
never been definitively determined
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to fall either within or outside
the realm of legal “right.” One
such duty directly addresses the
crucial issue of access to care by
requiring states to assure that
provider payments are not only
economical and efficient but also
“sufficient to enlist enough pro
viders so that care and services
are available . . . at least to the
extent that such care and services
are available to the general pop
ulation in the geographic area.”2
The purpose of this equal-access
duty could not be clearer: to as
sure that the right to Medicaid
is more than an empty promise
of care. Indeed, the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) further strength
ened Congress’s expectation that
Medicaid would result in access
to care, by separately clarifying
states’ obligation to ensure that
services are made available with
reasonable promptness.3
It would appear axiomatic that
when a state duty directly under
girding the Medicaid entitlement
is alleged to have been violated,
the courts will be available to
intervene. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has concluded that the
courts were available to the
pharmaceutical industry when it
sued to halt an alleged violation
by the state of Maine of Medic
aid’s prescription-drug coverage
requirements. In a case brought
by the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), the Court ultimately
ruled that Maine’s law was con
sistent with federal standards4
— yet the majority of the jus
tices did not question the appro
priateness of the lawsuit itself.
Since it involved no federal
“rights,” no action could be tak
en under Section 1983. But PhR
MA’s claim centered on an al
leged conflict between state and
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federal law, so the industry group
was presumed to have the right
to proceed directly under the U.S.
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause,
which renders unconstitutional
any state law that conflicts with
federal law, regardless of wheth
er the federal law at issue cre
ates a “right.”
In Maxwell-Jolly, the Ninth Cir
cuit similarly relied on the Su
premacy Clause in finding a right
to sue. In its ruling, the court
noted that Medicaid’s equalaccess statute itself did not con
fer a Section 1983 right, but it
found that the allegation of a
conflict between state action
and federal law brought the
claims within the scope of the
Supremacy Clause, thereby con
ferring on plaintiffs the right to
go to court. It is this critical
holding — that even where no
federal right is involved, Medic
aid beneficiaries and providers
can sue to prevent unconstitu
tional conduct — that is now
before the Supreme Court.
To blunt the implications of
their desired ruling that private
individuals have no means to
challenge states’ potentially un
constitutional conduct, the states
argue that enforcement of Med
icaid law by the federal govern
ment is sufficient. They further
argue that Supremacy Clause liti
gation should be curbed only in
the case of challenges to state
conduct under welfare spending
programs such as Medicaid, whose
constitutional basis is the Spend
ing Clause (which grants Congress
the power to collect taxes and
spend them for the country’s
general welfare), not challenges
to state conduct that allegedly vi
olates other types of federal
laws. But nothing in the Suprem
acy Clause cases decided by the
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Court to date allows such a dis
tinction: until now, all claims
that state conduct violates the
Constitution have been treated
equally in the eyes of the law.
The states’ claim that federal
oversight is sufficient is particu
larly ironic given the history of
federal enforcement of the equalaccess statute. Despite the fact
that this protection has been part
of the federal Medicaid statute
for 22 years, the Department of
Health and Human Services
(DHHS) has never issued de
tailed compliance standards,
much less enforced them. In
2010, the federal government
promised to issue standards and
in fact ultimately disapproved
California’s rate cuts, but disap
proval came years after the cuts
took effect and long after they
were enjoined in court. Even if
final rules are issued (a process
that could take years), there is
no guarantee of enforcement.
Indeed, DHHS’s track record for
Medicaid oversight is abysmal,
and for good reason: the statute
offers the secretary of health
and human services virtually no
meaningful enforcement tools.
She can refuse to approve the
state’s payment rates (as DHHS
ultimately did in this case) and
can threaten to withhold all fed
eral funding until the violation
is fixed. But the law contains no
practical steps such as providing
incentives to increase payment
rates, ordering an adjustment, or
imposing intermediate penalties
for failure to comply. Further
more, the federal administrative
review process is painfully slow,
leaving beneficiaries with no pro
tection against immediate injury.
A decision by the Court in Cali
fornia’s favor would shield states
from judicial accountability un
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less a separate state law could
be found to serve as the basis
to sue; beneficiaries could be
left unprotected against conduct
that immediately threatens health
and life.
It is hardly news where Med
icaid is concerned that states are
reeling from a combination of
bad economic conditions, high
poverty, a weak employer insur
ance market, escalating medical
costs, and an approach to fed
eral Medicaid financing that,
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while nominally generous, in fact
places far too great a burden on
weakened state economies. But
the imperative to restructure fed
eral–state Medicaid financing is
separate from the question wheth
er the poor should be barred
from seeking judicial redress for
violations of the very requirements
that give Medicaid its power and
meaning.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available with the full text of this arti
cle at NEJM.org.
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